Willing Wickedly: Ockham and Burley Compared

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Contrary to St. Thomas Aquinas and the rest of the scholastic tradition of Aristotelian ethics, William of Ockham argued that wickedness as wickedness could be willed. Specifically, he argued that Thomas was wrong to think that we can explain willed wickedness by positing ignorance of the particular propositions which form the minor premises in practical syllogisms.

Against Bl. John Duns Scotus, Ockham argued that willing wickedness is just as bad as doing something wicked. In support of his claim, Ockham distinguished between conditional and executive acts of will. What lends plausibility to the view that external acts are worse than internal volitions is our suspicion that willing wickedness without external action is somehow blameless because ineffectual. According to Ockham, that's a confusion that results from our failure to distinguish conditional volitions from executive acts of will. Conditional volitions do not result in external action because actual external actions were never intended; executive, formally imperative acts of will inevitably result in action unless impeded by an entirely extraneous external circumstance—such as, the failure of the firing mechanism of the weapon of a murderer.

Walter of Burley, like his predecessors in the classical and scholastic traditions denied that wickedness as wickedness could be willed. But he agreed with Ockham that sometimes ignorance of particulars cannot explain willed wickedness. When we depart from diets which dictate that 'all sweets should be eliminated from the diet' and eat chocolate truffles, we are not ignorant of their sweetness. Moreover, like Ockham's, Burley's account of practical reason involves executive acts.

So as is often the case, the views of these contemporaries are related in an interesting fashion, which brings us to a perennial problem: which of them wrote on ethics first? Burley was born about 1275;[1] Ockham,

[1] J. Weisheipl, *Repertorium Mertonense*, in: Mediaeval Studies, 31 (1969), 175.

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more than ten years later in about 1287.[2] But Ockham's teaching career was much shorter than Burley's; beginning about 1318, it effectively ended about 1328, when like Burley he entered the political arena. By contrast Burley's philosophical works date from 1301 until almost the end of his life in 1344. Specifically the work with which we shall be most concerned here, Burley's *Ethics* commentary is dated about 1333-1334,[3] more than ten years after Ockham's *De connexione virtutum*; so we will be considering a well-known older master's response to a younger man's work. Burley did not take kindly to Ockham. Even when he borrowed Aristotelian exposition from Ockham, Burley pointedly called him a beginner in logic.[4] Though Ockham was not named in the *Ethics*, presumably Burley was tacitly replying to him. And since Burley was partly convinced, though still very critical, it ought to be an interesting reply; and it is.

In this article, Ockham and Burley will be compared and contrasted on three topics:

1) how to explain cases where we do what we know is wrong
2) how to distinguish weakness of will from vice, or in medieval terms incontinence from intemperance, and
3) how to describe the link between knowledge and volition in moral acts.

In conclusion, I will consider what effect medieval speculations on vice may have had on the concept of intellect.

Much of this article will concern the difference between incontinence and intemperance, or between moral weakness and moral vice. It is a topic where examples are useful. For purposes of clarity, instead of simply alternating sexes in the examples, I have adopted a convention which presents weak women and wicked men. Unfortunately, experience suggests that there are also plenty of weak men and wicked women. The convention I adopted does not reflect my beliefs about the distribution of moral flaws among the sexes; rather it is a sign of sloth. There are more examples of weakness, and only male scholastic authors, so this convention makes ambiguity in pronoun reference easier to avoid.

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[2] R. Wood, *Ockham on the Virtues*, West Lafayette, Indiana 1997, 1.

[3] J. Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 1), 187.

[4] Burley, *Expositio s. totum Phys. Aristot.* I t.c.4-5 tr.1, f.8^{vb}; I t.c.15 tr.2 c.1, f.13^{rb}; III t.c. 11 tr.1 c.1, f.64^{rb}; IV t.c.42 tr.1 c.5, f.98^{vb}; VI t.c.24 tr.1 c.4, f. 183ra; VI t.c.79 tr.3 c.1, f.196va (ed. Venice 1501). *In Artem Veterem, Praedic.* 3, Venice 1541, f.33^{vb}, 34^{rb}. Cf. G. Gál, *Opera Philosophica Guillelmi de Ockham*, II, 24*.

1. *Must Wickedness be based on Ignorance?*

1.1 *Ockham*

Ockham's position on willing wickedness is well-known; it was, for example, ably discussed by Marilyn M. Adams at the 1994 Eastern Division APA Meeting in Boston.[5] Nonetheless, a brief summary based on Ockham's *De connexione virtutum* will be useful.

In that work, Ockham defends, among other things, the thesis that prudence without moral virtue is possible. That is, we can know perfectly well what it is we should do and yet fail to do it. We know the conclusion of the practical syllogism, and yet we do not choose to obey its dictate. Unlike his predecessors, who claim that we choose wickedness only because we somehow fail to understand our duty, Ockham claims that sometimes we cannot fail to understand. He holds that the intellect is necessitated or determined; by contrast, the will is free and undetermined. And since both Christian theologians[6] and pagan philosophers[7] agree that we are praised or blamed only for what is voluntary, Ockham concludes that the will is the primary moral faculty.[8]

Ockham's is a very Christian thesis, and not surprisingly, he defends it in part by adducing the authority of all the theologians who agree that there is malicious sin.[9] But malice does not differ from ignorance, if the malicious like the ignorant do not know the minor premise of the practical moral syllogism: 'everything worthy should be done, this is worthy, therefore this should be done'. The case based on malice is confirmed by an argument based on incontinence or weakness of will,[10] a case in which malefactors display awareness of what it is they should or should not do.

In the process of arguing for his conclusion Ockham rejects the various theories which had explained that what is really involved in wickedness is a form of ignorance. The first such thesis is the view that the minor

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[5] A revised version is forthcoming as *Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality*, in: P. Spade (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*.

[6] Cf. August., *De vera religione*, c.14, n. 27 (PL 34, 133): 'Nunc vero usque adeo peccatum voluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium.'; Anselmus, *De conceptu virginali*, c.4, ed. Schmitt (Rome 1950), vol. II, p. 145: 'Quid quid igitur faciunt, totum imputandum est voluntati.'.

[7] Cf. Aristot., *Nicomachean Ethics*, III.1. 1109b30-31; 3.5. 1114a22-30; Martinus Bracarensis, *Liber de moribus*, cited as Seneca, in: *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, Louvain-Paris 1974, p. 280 (1): 'Omnis peccati actio voluntaria est.'

[8] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. J.C. Wey, 364 (OTh VIII).

[9] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 365 (OTh VIII).

[10] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 367 (OTh VIII).

premise is unknown,[11] which I shall call the particular ignorance explanation (PIE). In the form presented by Ockham, PIE suggests that since the rectitude and certitude of scientific knowledge make it incompatible with moral error, it must be that the wicked are ignorant of the minor proposition. Ockham replies first that there is as much rectitude in the major premise as in the minor. So if we can know the major, and yet act wickedly, we can know the minor and act wickedly.

Ockham next rejects a variant of PIE, which distinguishes the ignorant from the malicious in terms of the intensity of their knowledge of the universal. Those who do wicked things maliciously have a well-developed understanding of the universal principles of moral science,[12] as opposed to the ignorant who understand such universals only dimly. To this Ockham replies that the degree of knowledge is not relevant; both know, or could know, the universal, since even the ignorant know that 'everything worthy should be done'. Yet on his opponents' account, neither the malicious nor the ignorant know the particular. There is no difference between what is known by the ignorant as opposed to the malicious unless one admits that the malicious know the particular in Ockham's view.[13]

The last of these suggestions is in some ways the most interesting—that the behavior of the incontinent is governed by two major premises:[14] 'nothing unworthy should be done' and 'everything enjoyable should be done'. And since she knows only 'this is enjoyable' and not 'this is unworthy', she acts unworthily. Here Ockham replies that we cannot *know* two such universal maxims, since they are incompatible. Assent to one militates against assent to the other. If this argument is rejected, he appeals to experience. Supposing such simultaneous assent is really possible, it is still true that people sometimes act unworthily even though they know the conclusion as well as the major and the minor premises of the practical syllogisms which dictate the avoidance of the unworthy.

The freedom of the will is the basis of the last of Ockham's proofs that we can will wickedness knowingly. In the sensitive appetite, perception is sometimes immediately followed by the inclination to grasp or to

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[11] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 365 (OTh VIII).

[12] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 365-6 (OTh VIII).

[13] Another rejected suggestion is that those who act wickedly have merely speculative knowledge, not practical knowledge, of moral propositions (*De connexione virtutum*, ed. Wey, 366 (OTh VIII).

[14] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 367 (OTh VIII).

avoid an object. But if the will is free, this cannot be its relation to the dictates of the intellect, according to Ockham.[15]

The classic reply to this argument is that the will can avert the intellect from considering any object. It is free because it determines what subjects the intellect considers, not because it can act contrary to the intellect's dictate.[16] Ockham counters by asking about the act of will which determined what subject the intellect considers: was it dictated by our understanding or not? If so, then the will is not free. If not, then since the will is not following an intellectual dictate, the will, not the intellect, is the primary moral faculty—contrary to the proponents of the original reply. Ockham concludes this series of arguments by explaining that in any series of acts of will and intellect, there is an original act of will which depends not on a demonstrated conclusion but on a bare act of intellect which manifests the object to the will.[17] So, basically, Ockham holds that the first act is an intellectual act, but denies that it is an act of reasoning; rather it is a bare manifestation, a merely apprehensive act.

In confirmation of his views, Ockham adds that sensitive appetite is just as capable as the will of averting the intellect,[18] and yet we do not call the sensitive act free on that account. He strengthens his claim that the intellect, unlike the will, is necessitated and not free, by reminding us that evidence compels the intellect.[19]

1.2 *Burley on Willing Wickedness*

A discussion of Burley's views on *Weakness of the Will* constitutes a chapter in a recent book by Risto Saarinen.[20] It is a valuable study of an important

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[15] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 367-70 (OTh VIII).
[16] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 368 (OTh VIII).
[17] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 368-9 (OTh VIII).
[18] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 369-70 (OTh VIII).
[19] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 370 (OTh VIII).
Another objection to Ockham's account of the freedom of the will suggests that the will is free in respect to external actions, not in respect to understanding. Ockham's reply to this objection is based on the claim that the relation between volition and external actions is not free. External acts follow from executive volitions not freely but inevitably, provided there is no impediment. His proof of this claim is based on authority. From St. Gregory he takes the claim that where there is volition there is action, see *XL Homiliarum in Evang.*, II h. 30 (PL 76, 1220 C). 'What an animal desires decisively, it will do' is a text drawn from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (9.4. 1048a8). Presumably, Ockham is here tacitly appealing to our experience as agents, as reflected in the works of theological and philosophical authorities.

[20] R. Saarinen, *Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine to Buridan*, Leiden 1994. My thanks to Saarinen whose book played an important role in the development

topic in medieval philosophy, which has been insufficiently studied. Some hints of the difficulty in studying Burley on Aristotle's *Ethics* are provided—one of which is the extent to which Burley borrows from his predecessors, most of all St. Thomas Aquinas, from whom a great deal of the literal exposition of the text is taken, as Saarinen indicates.[21] Moreover there is the problem with unnamed sources. There are a couple places which seem to indicate contact with Ockham as we shall see; similarly, it is chronologically quite possible that there is a debt to Geraldus Odonis whose pre-1329 *Commentary* antedates Burley's (1333-1334) by about five years; indeed it is quite likely that some of the interesting views about what goes wrong in incontinence described below come from Gerald.[22]

So much is taken from Aquinas, that it is not always easy to discern Burley's own views. Sometimes the quotation is so extensive that it is 'almost impossible to see [Burley's] own contribution.'[23] Facing this difficulty, and seeing that Burley advocates alternatives to PIE, Saarinen assumed that Burley had rejected PIE, Aquinas' principal solution to the problem of *akrasia*. But this strategy is too sweeping. We cannot simply disassociate from Burley the views he owes to Aquinas.

Saarinen contrasts Aquinas with Burley in terms of two models of *akrasia*. Thomas, he says, accounts for weakness in terms of ignorance of moral science; Burley, in terms of disregard for practical knowledge. According to Thomas, an incontinent person does not know the minor premise in the practical syllogism; according to Saarinen, Burley claims that incontinent people are 'clear-eyed'. Saarinen completes his exposition of Burley by suggesting that concupiscence acts only on the body; that would certainly explain why incontinent people can retain their knowledge while acting badly.[24]

I believe both that Burley's disagreement with Thomas is less basic and on a different point, having to do not with the absence of knowledge, but the absence of deliberation among the incontinent. I will show first that Burley and Aquinas do not disagree in the manner suggested by Saarinen. Over and over again, Burley says that moral science in the

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of my own views. Saarinen has continued his research, as the reader will see in his *Walter Burley on akrasia: Second Thoughts*, which appears in this issue of Vivarium.

[21] R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 131-3.

[22] Cf. R.A. Gauthier & J.Y. Jolif, *L'éthique à Nicomaque: Introduction, traduction et commentaire*, 2nd ed., Louvain-Paris 1970, 136.

[23] R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 132.

[24] R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 135-41.

incontinent is not actual (*non potest exire in actu*, *ignorat actu*, etc.),[25] but what is not actual is not 'clear-eyed' knowledge. As to the suggestion that knowledge is intact because concupiscence affects only the body not the intellect, it is the result of a misinterpretation of a text which Saarinen himself correctly translates: 'concupiscence not only moves the soul, but even . . . the body'.[26]

Saarinen's exposition is also based on a correct reading of a brief text from book VII ch. 3 of the *Ethics* which renders the whole puzzling. Burley says in one sentence that incontinence does not result from ignorance of the particular, minor premise in the practical syllogism, thus seemingly rejecting PIE,[27] the particular ignorance explanation of incontinence. But elsewhere Burley repeatedly approves the identification of incontinence with ignorance of the particular. For the purposes of establishing that Burley does not really want to hold that incontinence cannot involve ignorance of the particular, let me quote a couple of later passages in which he summarizes what has been established in the third chapter: There is a sentence at chapter 8 which reads: 'We should note that the incontinent [person] truly evaluates the universal but not the particular (*Notandum est quod incontinens . . . habet veram existimationem . . . in universali . . . sed habet falsam existimationem de eis in particulari*).'[28] A little later in the same chapter, we read: 'An incontinent [person] acts against a dictate of reason on account of passion, but passion passes rapidly, and when it ceases, she evaluates the particular correctly (*propter passionem operetur contra dictamen rationis, cessante tamen passione quae cito transit habet rectam existimationem in particulari*)'.[29] At chapter 10, Burley says that 'the incontinent's reason is not corrupt; she has right reason in the universal. When passion [first] arises she [also] has right reason in the particular; she has it actually [again], when passion ceases.'[30]

So Burley's apparent rejection of PIE is puzzling. To get to the bottom of the puzzle, let me explain the structure of book VII, chapter 3 of the *Ethics* as Burley expounds it. Chapter three concerns a problem set by Aristotle: what happens when someone does something wicked and

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[25] *Expositio Gualteri Burlei super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis*, 7.1.3, Venetiis: Arte Simonis de Luere, impensis Andree Torresani de Asula, 1500 [Hain, 4144], f.109^{vb} E-F, 110^{rb} P. Xerox copy; reproduced from UCLA's copy of the Bibliothèque Nationale original.

[26] R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 134-5.

[27] R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 138.

[28] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.8, f.116va B.

[29] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.8, f.116^{vb} D.

[30] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.10, f.118va F.

knows it? Are her acts unconsidered? Is she using her knowledge or not? In medieval terms: is she speculating as she acts (*agere speculante*)? Burley believes that Aristotle presents four solutions to this problem, and he quotes Eustratius as saying that Aristotle accepted the fourth more fully than the rest. Saarinen seems to have seen these four as mutually exclusive solutions. Since Burley had copied most of the first three from Aquinas, including the second, which is PIE, he may have considered it safe to ignore the first three, which is not the case.

In fact as Burley states at the outset, the first three solutions present the basic distinctions in terms of which the problem of incontinence is to be solved. The first solution is the most basic, the distinction between habitual knowledge and actual knowledge.[31] The second solves the problem by distinguishing between the different propositions in the practical syllogism and by suggesting PIE.[32] In response to the hardest case, in which the incontinent person says things which indicate that she knows that what she is doing, Aristotle distinguishes between knowledge which can and cannot be acted on. The habitual knowledge of healthy people who are awake is at their disposal in a way in which it is not accessible to sleepers, drunks, or the insane. For Burley, following Aquinas, inaccessible knowledge is described as 'bound', '*ligatus*'. Burley contrasts bound knowledge with released knowledge, or *habitus solutus*;[33] he distinguishes between accessible and inaccessible knowledge. Bound knowledge cannot actually be brought to bear on moral problems; or rather, premises known in this way are not actually available for the construction of syllogisms.

In the fourth solution,[34] Burley applies the three distinctions in a somewhat different way; the first is always operative. Coming to the second distinction, he considers what other parts of the practical syllogism besides the particular might not be known. The third distinction provides Burley with his basic picture of sins of passion: concupiscence wars against knowledge and succeeds in binding it, so that it cannot dictate action;[35] it affects both the body and the soul. Building on those distinctions, Burley then constructs what he describes as Aristotle's preferred, fourth solution. According to the fourth solution, concupiscence binds knowledge, as

[31] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.3, f.109^{rb} C.
[32] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.3, f.109$^{ra\text{-}rb}$ A.
[33] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.3, f.109va E.
[34] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.3, f.110ra J-K.
[35] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.3, f.109va-110ra G.

described in the third distinction, and as the second distinction suggests, only one premise is bound, but what is bound is the universal not the particular premise.

Finally in what is in effect a fifth solution,[36] Burley considers the possibility that an incontinent person actually knows both the major and the minor premise, but does not know the conclusion. He notes that if the major and minor are actually known in combination, the conclusion is unavoidable. But he suggests that they may not be combined (*applicatio actu praemissas ad invicem*).

Now what I think is going on here is Burley exploring different ways in which to introduce indeterminacy into the intellect. In addition to the PIE model, in the fourth solution, Burley describes a second model where the major premise is inaccessible;[37] in the fifth solution, a third model, featuring known, but uncombined premises accounts for an incontinent person's ignorance of the conclusion.[38] Not only Burley's continued acceptance of PIE, but his use of language like 'someone can' suggests that this is the case.

What do we make of Burley's assertion, in the course of describing the third model, that the minor is not unknown? He may be referring to the simple premise 'this is sweet', rather than to the qualified premise 'this is a sweet I should not eat'. Earlier he has noted that 'this is sweet' is only accidentally opposed to 'all sweets are to be eliminated from the diet'.[39] Only in the presence of an passion for sweets is knowledge of the simple minor likely to lead to actions incompatible with the course of action suggested by the major.

Suppose that the three models presented in solutions two, four and five are alternative, but not mutually exclusive, solutions. What purpose might be served by introducing them? Perhaps Burley recognized that incontinence might have more than one explanation. Sometimes we do not recognize an action as unworthy (PIE, model 1), but also sometimes we do not stop to think or combine the relevant premises (model 3). As Aristotle pointed out, it even sometimes happens, that we say things we do not understand. In Burley's terms we may say that we have to maintain a reasonable weight, but not really understand the risk that a fatty diet

[36] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.3, f.110^{rb} O.
[37] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.3, f.110ra J-K.
[38] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.3, f.110^{rb} O.
[39] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.3, f.110ra G.

presents; model two describes a case in which we won't really understand until our first heart attack.[40]

I see this is as an interesting variation on Thomas, whom Burley endorses as 'the common expositor'.[41] Moreover, at least one modern student of Aristotle, David Charles,[42] suggests that Aristotle presents a similar account. Describing what I have called Burley's model two, he says that 'there is one type of *akratês* who actually reaches the good conclusion (in an off-colour way) but does not act on it.' 'If,' as Charles says, 'this account of the chapter's structure is correct,' then where Burley modifies Aquinas' account by providing alternate models of incontinence, it is in the direction of greater fidelity to Aristotle.[43]

Where Burley does disagree with Thomas is on the subject of deliberation.[44] Here again a glance at Saarinen is instructive. Saarinen (quite correctly I believe) sees Thomas as a proponent of the view that incontinence, though voluntary, is not deliberately chosen.[45] By contrast to Bonnie Kent,[46] who emphasizes the Augustinian aspects of Thomas' theological works which suggest that incontinence is deliberately undertaken, Saarinen holds that Thomas follows Aristotle on the key point—namely, that incontinence results from ignorance. Concupiscence averts the intellect, so that the practical syllogism required for continence is not completed. Saarinen accounts for the passages in the theological works which indicate that incontinence is deliberate by what he calls the 'two step explanation' of incontinence.[47] The first step is some sort of failure of actual knowledge regarding the syllogism which would prohibit the act. The second step is the completion of a misleading syllogism, which begins 'everything sweet is delectable' and licenses incontinence. Incontinence is deliberate in the sense that it results from a permissive practical syllogism; it is not deliberate in the sense that the failure to complete the

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[40] Models two and three both describe cases in which the ignorance involved is not ignorance of the particular, but ignorance of the conclusion (ICE).

[41] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.4, f.114^{vb} C.

[42] *Aristotle's Philosophy of Action*, Ithaca, NY 1984, 128; cf. 156; 168.

[43] Cf. also Norman Dahl, *Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will*, Minneapolis 1984, 200. By contrast to conclusions known in an 'off-colour way' or 'not fully possessed', real knowledge is 'integrated' according to Charles and Dahl.

[44] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.3, f.110ra K. The view Burley is opposing is stated in Aquinas' *Summa theol.* I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 4; cf. also *De malo* q. 3 a. 9 ad 7.

[45] R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 126.

[46] *Transitory Vice: Thomas Aquinas on Incontinence*, in: Journal of the History of Philosophy, 27 (1989), 199-223.

[47] R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 127-9.

prohibitive syllogism is the result of ignorance, and not something chosen.

As we saw above, Ockham challenges such accounts of incontinence. He denies that the intellect can simultaneously assent to two universal premises with contrary implications. Here Burley agrees with Ockham in rejecting Thomas' account of incontinence as the result of a permissive syllogism, though on different grounds. Burley holds that concupiscence inclines directly to particulars, rather than achieving its effects by means of a practical syllogism. He does not believe that it is proper to depict concupiscence as providing an alternate major premise—such as, 'everything sweet should eaten'. 'Since concupisicence is a passion of the sensitive soul,' Burley says: 'it seems to me that it does not incline by means of some universal, but only [directly] to particulars.'[48] He appears to be suggesting an account of incontinence which permits acts dictated only in particular, not as the result of syllogistic deliberation, an account in which concupiscence results in unconsidered acts. Thus where Burley departs from Thomas, it is to undermine the view that incontinence is deliberate in one sense. It takes him not farther from, but closer to the Aristotelian account of *akrasia* as voluntary but not deliberate.

2. *Incontinence and Intemperance*

2.1 *Ockham*

For Aristotle incontinence is not a vice, because it is the result of passion, not a deliberate choice (*NE* 7.8. 1151a5-7; 7.9. 1152a4-7); by contrast, intemperance and more generally vice 'expresses decision' (*NE* 7.8. 1151a7). Following Cicero,[49] the medieval virtue/vice literature takes another line. It distinguishes continence as sexual virtue from temperance as virtue in eating and drinking—e.g. Phillip the Chancellor, *Summa de Bono*.[50] Accordingly, medieval interpreters of Aristotle's ethics describe incontinence as a vice. Ockham, for example, quite correctly observes that, according to Aristotle, the temperate, unlike the continent, are not troubled by inordinate passion (*NE* 3.11. 1119a11-20).[51] But Ockham does not, and probably could not, say that intemperance is a vice but incontinence is not.

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[48] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.3, f.110ra K.

[49] Cicero, *Oratio in Catilinam*, 2. 25. Cited, for example, by Albert, *De bono* 3.2.223, ed. H. Kühle et al., Münster in Westph. 1951, 135 (OO 28).

[50] Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis, *Summa de bono*, ed. N. Wicki, Bernae 1985, 900.

[51] Ockham, *Circa virtutes et vitia*, edd. G. Etzkorn & F. Kelley, 273 (OTh VIII).

Ordinarily Ockham uses the two terms in the usual medieval fashion, so that 'temperance' means restraint in eating and drinking,[52] as contrasted with restraint in sexual matters, or 'continence'. Ockham realizes that Aristotle related both temperance and continence to bodily pleasures generally. He describes Aristotelian temperance as a superior degree of continence—superior, either because inclinations for depraved pleasures are absent, or because the person involved has taken steps to avoid temptation.[53] This presents no major interpretive problems; the difficulty is rather with incontinence, which Ockham, like other medievals, sees as a vice distinguished from intemperance only by its subject matter.

What this means for the larger question is that to some degree Ockham lacks an account of wicked acts which are the result of weakness rather than vice. According to Ockham, there are three causes of vice: ignorance, malice, or passion.[54] He has no difficulty in accounting for chosen wickedness or malice. But concerning passion, Ockham appears poorly positioned. How would he account for wickedness produced by passion, but without malice—vices of weakness rather than deliberation? How can he distinguish passion from malice?

He might claim to deal with the distinction in one of two ways. He can account for weakness of will as a form of conditional willing—being moved by passion not to will the worthy unconditionally. To take a dietary example, I might wish to abstain from sweets only if that need not result in any loss of pleasure. To take a charitable example, I might wish to give a million dollars to UNICEF if I had it. My not having a million dollars, Ockham contends, is a partial object of that volition. Willing to give a million dollars you have is an entirely different act from willing to give away what you do not have, according to Ockham. So this model of weakness of will suggests simply that my desire for pleasure exceeds my desire to live virtuously. What has gone wrong is that the desire for virtue rather than the desire for pleasure is conditional, not absolute.

Ockham might also account for weakness of will in terms of the degrees of virtue he posits. Virtue in the first degree is defined as follows: . . . someone wills the performance of just works in conformity with right reason, as it dictates that such acts should be performed, according to the

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[52] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3 & a. 4, ed. Wey, 361 & 393 (OTh VIII).

[53] Ockham, *Circa virtutes et vitia*, 273-5 (OTh VIII).

[54] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 354 (OTh VIII). This is a traditional account, cf. Bonaventura's 'ignorantia, infirmitas, malitia,' *Sent*., II d. 43 a. 3 q. 2, *Opera omnia* II:994s.

proper circumstances respecting precisely this work, on account of the worthiness of this work itself, as an end.[55] Second degree virtue adds to this definition the determination to persevere. Supposing vice were defined in parallel fashion, the incontinent might be said to be guilty of only first degree vice, since they do not intend to persist. Their act is contrary to right reason and hence vicious, and their goal is unworthy, but they do not plan to continue.

What is suggested here as a solution Ockham might have advanced—namely, that incontinence is vice in a minor degree—is not far from St. Thomas Aquinas' view. Aquinas following Aristotle (*NE* 7.8. 1151a5-6) holds that incontinence is vice (or rather *depravity*) only in a qualified, not an unqualified sense of the term, because it is not continuous.[56] But where Aquinas and Burley appear to have a fundamental problem, because they deny that we can knowingly choose wickedness, Ockham does not; there is no reason he need deny that passion motivates knowingly wicked choices. Rather what Ockham may have difficulty accounting for are cases of self-deception, or vices which result from partial ignorance. He cites Aristotle in behalf of the claim that when we know the major and minor premises of a practical syllogism, we cannot fail to know the conclusion.[57] By contrast, as we saw above, Burley's account of weakness of will consists of a description of various models of incomplete knowledge or self-deception.

2.2 *Burley*

If the commonest cases of incontinence result from ignorance of particulars, according to Burley, the problem with intemperance is that knowledge of the universal is corrupted. Both are voluntary, but intemperance, unlike incontinence, is deliberate. Like Ockham, Burley correctly understands Aristotle's distinction at least in part, indicating that neither the temperate nor the intemperate is much troubled by passion—or rather inordinate appetite.[58] He even recites a passages from Eustratius in which the statement is made that incontinence is not a vice.[59] But like other medieval theologians, he cannot deny that incontinence is a vice.

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[55] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 2, ed. Wey, 335 (OTh VIII).
[56] Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, 7.8, Rome 1969, OO 47, 415.
[57] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 367 (OTh VIII).
[58] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7, f.111^{rb}, 115^{rb}.
[59] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.1, f.105^{vb} K.

Ultimately, Burley claims that incontinence is *partly* a vice—only partly, because although appetite is corrupt, reason is not.[60] The incontinent properly understand the universal proposition which indicates what our proper ends should be, at least most of the time. Their problem is that their reason is overwhelmed by their passion.

Concerning intemperance, Burley like a number of other medieval commentators had no difficulty understanding that Aristotle was not using the term as the medievals did, to refer only to vices of eating and drinking. Aristotelian intemperance, according to Burley, is habitual lack of right reason concerning all bodily pleasures, making them the ends of life.[61] For Burley, as for Ockham, temperance is a superior degree of continence: right reason concerning bodily pleasures undisturbed by strong inclinations.

Burley does do things a modern Aristotle commentator would not do—such as, claiming that continence is a mean,[62] and holding that continence differs from other virtues mainly in that it is not a firm habit, but rather a habitual disposition.[63] Like Ockham and other medievals,[64] Burley includes bestiality among the vices [rather than excluding it as the result of nature]. Burley makes Aristotle a worse sexist than he really is, suggesting that in the Aristotelian scheme of things women do not count either as continent or incontinent.[65] But his grasp of the basic Aristotelian concept of weakness of will appears unexceptionable: knowing what is right, but being led by appetite to act wickedly. The contrasting state of intemperance prompted not by strong appetite but deliberately chosen false principles corresponds to Aristotle's statement that the intemperate person thinks he is right (*NE* 7.9. 1152a6-7).

Let us return now to Ockham's more Christian scheme for dividing vice according to its causes: ignorance, passion, and malice. Incontinence is the Aristotelian description which most closely resembles vices of passion,[66] while intemperance resembles malice in some respects. Moreover, Ockham argues that orthodox Aristotelians cannot distinguish passion and malice from each other and from vice. Aquinas distinguishes malice from passion, or rather intemperance from incontinence. Intemperance results

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[60] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.4, f.111ra B.
[61] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.8, f.116ra A-B.
[62] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.9, f.117^{ra-vb}.
[63] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.8, f.116^{vb} E.
[64] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 343 (OTh VIII).
[65] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.5, f.112^{rb} A.
[66] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.8, f.116ra B.

from deliberately chosen vicious acts; its ultimate origin is the failure to grasp the first principles of moral philosophy—the major premises of practical syllogisms. If intemperance is produced by ignorance of the major premise, incontinence results from ignorance of the minor premises in such syllogisms. Ockham rejects this account, holding that no one can fail to know such major premises as 'everything unworthy should be avoided'. Thus if there is ignorance, it must be ignorance of the minor in the case of the malicious as well as the incontinent.

On this topic, Burley does not seem to have taken Ockham's criticism very seriously. He simply adopts Thomas' account. Like Aquinas, Burley distinguishes between incontinence which is a temporary disturbance and intemperance which is habitual.

Neither Ockham nor Burley treats vices which result from ignorance separately. As we saw above, Ockham attacks the Thomistic position for failing to distinguish between vice which result from ignorance and those which result from malice or passion (incontinence). Again this is an attack which Burley did not take seriously. Perhaps, there are perfectly good reasons for this. Ockham agrees with Burley that there are some circumstances in which ignorance is exculpatory. Ockham's distinction between culpable and non-culpable ignorance regarding vice is straight-forward. Inculpable ignorance is insurmountable; culpable ignorance arises when we can and should know what we do not know.[67] Burley's account is similar; ignorance excuses only when we ourselves (or our credulity) is not responsible for our ignorance.[68]

Non-culpable ignorance can be disregarded, since it does not count as vicious at all. Culpable ignorance would be treated as the result either of passion or of malice. Indeed Burley treats incontinence as a form of

[67] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 354 (OTh VIII).

[68] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.2, f.108ra C: 'Ad rationem hic factam dicendum quando dicitur quod ille qui operatur malum sciens illud esse malum est peior illo qui operatur malum ignorans illud esse malum, dico quod ista maior non est universaliter vera nisi cum duabus condicionibus superaddendis—scilicet (1) quod ipse operans non sit causa suae ignorantiae seu falsae credulitatis. Ignorantia enim vel error cuius homo est causa non excusat ipsum, ut patet ex III huius; sed intemperatus est causa suae ignorantiae et erroris; nam nos sumus causae vitiorum et virtutum; virtutes enim et vitia sunt in nostra potestate ut patet ex III huius. Alia condicio (2) est quod cetera ab ignorantia unius et scientia alterius sint paria quod non accidit in proposito. Nam incontinens habet concupiscentias vehementes delectationum, et intemperatus aut non habet huiusmodi concupiscentias, aut habet eas debiles et remissas; et minus malus est qui fortiter concupiscens operatur malum quam qui non concupiscens vel debiliter concupiscens operatur simile malum.'

ignorance resulting from passion, while intemperance might be regarded as maliciously induced ignorance.[69] Thus Burley might claim that a separate treatment of the vices of ignorance would be superfluous.

3. *How is What We Do Related to What We Know and Will?*

3.1 *Ockham*

If the suggestion made at the end of the last section is correct, most medieval ethical philosophers are chiefly concerned to account for vices produced by passion and malice. In terms of the issues which divide Ockham and Burley, as followers of Scotus and Aquinas, respectively, the focus is on volitional and intellectual vices. Ockham and Scotus treat all vice as volitional and the will as the true rational agent; by contrast, Burley and Aquinas describe both intemperance and incontinence, or vices of passion and malice, in terms of defective knowledge. A consideration of the issues that divide the partisans of the primacy of will from those of the primacy of intellect would take us far afield. What will concern me here, instead, is an issue on which Ockham and Burley depart from their respective schools: the execution of virtuous and vicious acts.

Having rejected the intellect as an important moral faculty on the ground that it is not a free, but a natural faculty compelled by evidence, Scotus was willing to hold that the actual execution of volition had a distinct moral significance. His was a model of fittingness which likens virtue to dancing; what has moral value is not just what you will, but what you actually do in particular circumstances. Actually to do something is better than merely to will it.[70] Ockham disagrees and deploys a variety of arguments in the dispute. One claims that extrinsic actions can have no independent moral significance because the same physical act is virtuous when performed for one reason, and vicious when performed for another. Such acts are only accidentally, not intrinsically good. A second suggests that we may be misled by the fact that people who are actually vicious sometimes have their behavior reinforced by the results of that behavior—as when eating one pistachio produces a craving that results in our consuming the entire contents of the container. Another indicates that Scotus' view has confused what is more severely punished on earth in order to

[69] As quoted in the previous note.

[70] M. McCord Adams, *Is to Will It as Bad As To Do It?*, in: Franciscan Studies, 41 (1981), 5-60.

maintain public order with what is more vicious. Finally, we may be confusing volition which does not result in action with weak volition.[71]

In fact, it is logically possible for equally intense, and hence equally reprehensible, acts of willing wickedness to have vastly different consequences. Suppose two commanders, Henry and Roger, both order the execution of an innocent soldier in identical circumstances. Henry's order is immediately carried out, while Roger's is accidentally delayed, and the soldier escapes. Henry may be tempted by the success of this method of eliminating annoyance to issue similar commands, so his vice may be strengthened; certainly, if the sovereign, King Stephen, wants to encourage enlistment, he will have to punish Henry more severely than Roger. But from the point of view of an omniscent God, at the time the order is issued there is nothing in the situation which would justify excusing Roger but not Henry, according to Ockham. Both commanders have elicited a formally imperative, executive act of will,[72] and hence both are equally blameworthy.

When the widow of Henry's victim objects that the actions of the two commanders are not comparable, she's right if she means that Stephen should punish Henry more severely, but wrong if she thinks that God will not punish Roger just as harshly as Henry was punished. The widow is wrong, according to Ockham, provided both Henry and Roger unconditionally willed the execution—that is, provided their acts of volition were both formally imperative. Neither had any more reason to believe that the soldier would survive than I have that my hand will not grasp, or my stomach digest, the sweet I decide to eat. It is certainly possible that the volition will be impeded, but not because of anything of which I am aware or in control. And since morality pertains to what is voluntary, as Augustine and Aristotle agree, circumstances like a sudden paralysis of my hand are not relevant to evaluating me as a moral agent.

Ockham distinguishes between conditional and formally imperative executive acts of will to take account of the sort of considerations which Scotus and his defender, Ockham's enemy Walter Chatton, offered in justification of the view that doing good is better than willing it. Ockham admits that actually committing murder is worse than conditionally willing murder—that is, where the act is only equivalently imperative. He denies that there is a difference in the moral significance of formally imperative, executive acts of willing murder, which depend on whether

[71] Ockham, *Sent.*, 3 q.11, edd. F.E. Kelley & G.I. Etzkorn, 375-9 (OTh VI).
[72] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 372 (OTh VIII).

they are or are not unaccompanied by the corresponding external acts.

This does not mean that Ockham was unaware of the moral significance of impediments to action. He distinguishes between relevant impediments of which we are aware in making moral choices and those which, however much they affect the outcome, do not affect those choices. Impediments which restrict action are partial objects of a conditional volition. If we are aware of impediments, formally imperative acts of will are impossible. Moreover, conditionally willing murder is less culpable than willing its actual executation.

Formally imperative volition is possible only where there are, or appear to be, no impediments. In some sense Ockham has built the executive function into his description of imperative volition. His description is intended to eliminate as irrelevant situations in which if the outcome differs in any respect from the willed exterior act, that difference is accidental—resulting from factors we neither know nor control.

3.2 *Burley*

Now Burley also describes executive acts, and he does so in describing prudence.[73] It is from the *Nicomachean Ethics* (6.9. 1143a7) that the concept of executive acts arises.[74] Albert, and Thomas following him, explain Aristotelian prudence in terms of a three-fold distinction;[75] for Thomas the third member is *praecipere* or command.[76] Albert and Thomas use this distinction to explain the difference between mere comprehension, *synesis*, and prudence. Thomas tells us that though in the speculative sciences, there are only two steps: inquiry and judgment; in the practical sciences inquiry and consideration must be followed by action or command.

Ockham is implicitly citing the same passage when he tells us that understanding only involves two steps, after which the conclusion necessarily follows.[77] That conclusion was drawn by Thomas at *Ethics*, 7.3.

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[73] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.10, f.118^{rb} C.

[74] The earliest medieval use with which I am familiar comes from Albert the Great, who uses the concept in explaining the difference between prudence and judgment (*Super Eth.* 6.15, ed. W. Kübel, Münster in Westph. 1987, 485-7 (OO 14).

[75] This distinction comes ultimately from a more complicated passage in Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa* which mentions *inquisitio*, *consiliatio* and *electio*, cf. the '*Versio Burgundio*' c.36, ed. E.M. Buytaert, Louvain-Paderborn 1955, 137. Gauthier maintains Thomas' identifies judgment and command, but distinguishes between command as an intellectual dictate and as an act of will.

[76] Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, 6.9, Rome 1969, OO 47, 366.

[77] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 367 (OTh VIII).

1147a24, but Ockham cites instead the opening passages of the *Posterior Analytics* (1.1. 71a20).[78] Presumably Ockham's choice of references is dictated at least in part by the wish to avoid passages in which Aristotle says that prudence is not prudence unless it is acted upon.

Ockham uses this dictum about two step speculative reasoning to prove that there can be prudence without virtuous action. Once we know the major and minor premises of a practical syllogism, the conclusion is evident at once. And since Ockham identifies prudence as knowledge of the conclusion of the practical syllogism, in his view, once the dictate is formulated, there is prudence. But not everyone who knows the premises of a practical syllogism acts virtuously. Therefore, there can be prudence in the absence of virtue.[79]

Burley has this argument in mind when he explains incontinence, citing the passage used by Ockham from the *Posterior Analytics*.[80] But Burley argues instead that as long as concupiscence prevents us from applying the minor to the major, prudence can be absent. His aim is to safeguard the claim that there is no prudence without virtue.

Burley has another defense, with much more far reaching implications, against Ockham's *Posterior Analytics* argument. It is based on the *Ethics* VII passage. Again it is an explanation for how the premises of a practical syllogism can be known without producing prudence. Burley starts with Aquinas' account of the distinction between the relation of premises to conclusion in the practical as versus the demonstrative syllogism. Instead of a propositional conclusion, a practical syllogism leads to action. Whereas positing the premises of a demonstrative syllogism simultaneously leads necessarily to the concluding proposition, positing the premises of a practical syllogism does not necessarily lead to action. The agent can be impeded by external circumstances so that she cannot execute the act dictated by practical reason. Burley says that action follows judgment not as a conclusion follows from premises with logical necessity, but as rain follows from clouds.[81] To me it seems that this is the difference between complete and partial causes, from which we could conclude that understanding does not by itself determine execution.

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[78] In expounding this passage from the *Posterior Analytics* Thomas says (*Lect.* 2) that in some syllogisms, once the major and minor are known, the conclusion follows immediately. Ockham states unqualifiedly that the conclusion follows immediately once the premises are known, an interpretation of this passage for which he could have cited Giles of Rome.

[79] Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 367 (OTh VIII).

[80] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.3, f.110^{rb} P.

[81] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.3, f.109^{vb}-110ra G.

When expounding book VI c.9, Burley uses Aquinas' terminology for the three acts of prudence: inquiry, judgement and command. But at book VII,[82] he describes the third part of prudence as 'executive' (*executiva vel praeceptiva executionis*). So what has happened is that Burley has contrasted impedable practical reasoning with speculative reasoning that is inevitably successful once the premises are combined. He has pointed to the weakness of the link between intellectual judgment and practical execution.

If Ockham's picture of the soul links will and execution, Burley's exposition of Aristotle unlinks intellect and execution. They are complementary philosophical strategies, both of which call our attention to possible problems in the link between understanding and action. Burley emphasizes that the intellect cannot be a total cause in the practical sphere; Ockham stresses the connection of moral practice and will. Burley, like Ockham, maintains that understanding does not determine action. And though he does not maintain that volition determines execution, Ockham seeks to show that interruptions of that linkage, unlike the link between understanding and volition, are morally irrelevant.

It is odd to find Burley lining up with an advocate of the primacy of the will. Certainly, Ockham and the Franciscans, with their caricature of Thomism, would be surprised. And doubtless there are Thomists—perhaps Giles of Rome is an example—who would be horrified. But Thomas himself might not be. Gauthier has argued persuasively that for Thomas, prudence is a habit of will as well as intellect.[83] Specifically, he suggests a role for will in the execution of the command which is logically though not temporally distinct from the judgment of the intellect. For Aquinas, as for Burley, an adequate account of incontinence requires that we posit something other than understanding, or the lack of it, to link judgment and action, something which functions properly in some cases and not in others.

4. *Conclusion*

Since Burley's work is considerably less well-known than Ockham's, I will conclude by considering Burley's contribution to medieval ethics. Burley aimed at completeness rather than originality in his *Ethics Commentary*. Most of Grosseteste's notes are included, as are substantial excerpts from Eustratius'

[82] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.10, f.118^{rb} C.

[83] R.A. Gauthier, in a review of *Psychologie et morale* by O. Lottin, in: Bulletin Thomiste, 8 (1947-1953), 65-9.

commentary. What Burley sought to provide, and what his readers were looking for, was a competent summary of common opinion, revised in accordance with modern views. Burley's commentary is very well structured; it would be worth having if only for the outline at its beginning: he lists of all the questions and doubts raised by each book of the *Ethics*, together with common propositions and the conclusions. The conclusions in the text and the margin are numbered to correspond to the list at the beginning.

Burley modernized the treatment by adding short notes to the exposition; that is where any original contributions will be found, introduced by words such as '*notandum*', '*intelligendum*', or '*dubium est*'. Often these sections in which he treats problems raised by his contemporaries reflect Burley's logical interests. There is, for example, a sustained discussion of the question in what sense the statement 'the incontinent man abandons any and every choice' is a self-evident proposition,[84] with reference to the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*. These discussions are scattered and brief, so it is hard to evaluate their importance. In one regard, at least, we may see Burley's treatment as significant in the history of philosophy.

Sarah Broadie holds that viewing knowledge as a state rather than an activity is a consequence of the 'modern dialogue with scepticism.'[85] Because the exercise of knowledge does not add to its justification or secure it from skeptical attack, our concept of knowledge no longer includes its exercise, she thinks. Viewing knowledge narrowly as a state, if they value its exercise, she argues that moderns have to decide which of our non-rational faculties its exercise should be attributed to—'will or sensibility.'

What we have seen in the medieval dialogue with Aristotle suggests another history, in which stress on the will is not a product of preoccupation with skeptical concerns; nor is the will separated from our rational nature. Indeed, both Ockham and Scotus claim that the will is the primary rational faculty. The problem is not placing value on the exercise of our rational faculty, it is rather how to explain the interplay of intellect and will in that exercise. Certainly it was not an attempt to reply to skeptical arguments (with which Ockham, for example, was notoriously unconcerned), which led medievals to focus on the will. Rather, it was an attempt to account for disorders in the exercise of our rational faculty

[84] *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.9, f.117^{rb} C-D.
[85] S. Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle*, Oxford-New York 1991, 291.

which led to the description of the intellect as a state, distinct from its exercise. In this development, Burley plays an important role, influencing orthodox Aristotelianism in the manner suggested by Scotus and Ockham—by stressing the weakness of the link between understanding and execution and by expanding on Aquinas' account of indeterminacy in the intellect.

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